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A wake-up call from enlargement fatigue:  
The cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia  
 
Anne Bercio / Katrin Böttger
Given the current criticism of EU foreign policy 
after the Lisbon Treaty, the EU urgently needs 
success in the Western Balkan’s approximation to 
the EU in order to reassert its own foreign policy 
standing. After the 2004 enlargement, the EU has 
been widely advocating its accession policy as its 
most successful foreign policy instrument. With 
the Western Balkan countries’ ambitions for and 
great expectations in a future EU membership, 
the confirmation of the “European perspective” 
at Thessaloniki 2003, should have put them on 
a stable and progressive path towards European 
Union membership.
However, if we follow recent progress reports 
as well as the public and scientific debates, we can 
identify a prevalence of pessimistic attitudes and a 
general lack of enthusiasm concerning the progress 
made towards EU standards by the Western Balkan 
countries. This is also mirrored in the fact that the 
EU has introduced several additional accession 
criteria along the way, which has reduced the EU’s 
credibility in the Western Balkan region. Moreover, 
the countless steps from the pre-accession phase up 
to the post-enlargement structural funding phase 
have been fine-tuned, revised and adopted to the 
specific situation of the accession candidates in 
the Western Balkans. Today an incentive structure 
more tightly knit than was the case for the Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) countries exists. In 
addition, the EU is employing a more flexible 
individualized approach to each country in the 
region which, in theory, takes into account needs 
and problems of each country and may offer tailor-
made assistance.
In the policy brief at hand we aim to identify the 
reasons for the ineffectiveness of these dynamics 
and the stalling approximation process. Although 
the region is often handled as one entity, it is 
unavoidable to look at the countries individually. 
For the purpose of this paper we have selected two 
countries in the Western Balkan region with very 
different accession performances so far. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the ongoing approximation seems 
to be hampered by a number of reasons, while 
Serbia appears to be on a relatively foreseeable 
track towards full-fledged membership with the 
candidate status being granted at the European 
Council meeting on 1./2. March 2012 after that 
decision had been postponed in December 2011. 
We specifically analyse acquis conditionality, i.e. 
the compliance with legal acts and mechanisms 
of the EU acquis communautaire in exchange 
of benefits and rewards leading to a closer 
approximation with the European Union. Based 
on the reasons found for non-compliance in the 
cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, we will 
formulate policy recommendations for how to 
overcome obstacles the enlargement process is 
currently facing concerning the two target countries 
and the enlargement policy in general. 
Recent developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
For Bosnia-Herzegovina, the year 2011 was 
mainly shaped by political immobility. After the 
parliamentary elections on 3 October 2010 a 
coalition government was formed only 15 months 
later when the risk of financial collapse became 
imminent. The opposing political parties managed 
to find a compromise in late December 2011, by 
which a lacklustre coalition government is to be 
formed. With this compromise none of the different 
entities is “getting everything” as the leader of the pro 
Serbian-nationalistic party SNDS Milorad Dodik 
put it. The prime minister is Vjekoslav Bevanda 
from the leading Croatian party HDZ. Out of the 
six governing parties only the social-democratic 
party SDP is multi ethnic. The distribution of the 
important portfolios has yet to be decided and 
although an agreement has been established, it has 
yet to be implemented. Meanwhile, two important 
legal acts were passed in response to repeated 
requests by the EU in its progress reports: the law on 
state aid and the law on census. Therefore, the first 
step out of domestic lethargy has been completed 
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but further efforts geared towards political stability 
and additional implementation of the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement are still pending. 
Recent developments in Serbia 
In 2011 Serbia made good progress in 
strengthening the public administration and in 
political reform. Despite a deficit in economic 
reforms, the overall assessment also of the 
European Commission has been positive. At 
the recent European Council meeting Serbia 
was granted the EU candidate status due to 
the country’s compliance with the demands 
for full cooperation with the ICTY, improved 
relations with neighboring countries, as well as 
to recognizable improvement of Serbia-Kosovo 
relations. In addition, it signed a protocol on the 
statute of minorities with Romania. A demand 
that had been made by the Romanian government 
after granting candidate status had already been 
preliminarily agreed upon in the General Affairs 
Council on 27 February 2012.
After the conflict in Northern Kosovo turned 
violent in December 2011, Serbia’s candidacy was 
blocked by some EU member states, particularly 
Germany, and further EU approximation was 
made conditional upon Belgrade’s ability to 
allow EULEX and KFOR to fully execute their 
mandates. 
Recent developments show that the EU 
extended it’s enlargement strategy by “two-track 
negotiations” which separate the acknowledgment 
of a sovereign Republic of Kosovo from the 
improvements of domestic economic and 
administrational reforms. With Serbia being 
granted the EU candidate status the European 
Council followed the European Commission’s 
recommendation and last but not least strengthened 
the pro-European Serbian government with regard 
to the upcoming parliamentary elections of 
May 2012.
EU related reasons for lack of progress
The first reason for defective acquis conditionality 
is a result from the EU’s experience in previous 
enlargement rounds. EU actors now stress the 
fact that enlargement is an open-ended process 
meaning that dates and deadlines are not supposed 
to be set beforehand, as all steps taken depend 
on the performance of the accession country in 
question. In addition, the EU now prefers bilateral 
negotiations rather than a „package solution“, 
as was the practice until 2004, where groups of 
countries were prepared collectively to join the 
EU. For Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia these 
lengthy “individualized solutions” directly affect 
the domestic population’s attitude towards joining 
the EU. While in Serbia polls have dropped 
down to an alarming 51 percent1 when Serbians 
were asked whether the country should join the 
EU, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still 
positive: 83 percent2 are in favour of a potential 
EU accession. However it is unclear how the 
situation in the region will be affected after the 
accession of Croatia and Iceland. It is especially 
problematic that there are no current member 
states that strongly advocate on behalf of further 
enlargement. This is due to the fact that in times of 
constant crisis the Western Balkan countries have 
been shifted to the back of the political agenda, as 
the region is composed of small countries and has 
little to no political and economic power beyond 
its borders. Nevertheless security and stability in 
WB must remain an EU priority not least due to 
moral obligations. 
In general the ongoing EU approximation 
process is assessed rather negatively for Bosnia-
Herzegovina and rather positively for Serbia. 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, although considerable 
progress has been achieved when it comes to 
acquis compliance regarding individual policies 
and acquis chapters, the overall political process 
is characterised as shaky. In Serbia, civil servants 
directly involved in the approximation process 
have managed to address technical aspects, 
although they have excluded the political 
dimension. When de-politisation is successful, 
compliance with the EU acquis will have been 
achieved. In these cases, acquis conditionality 
appears to be effective, and according to EU 
1 EurActiv RS: Pad podrške građana ulasku u EU. http://www.
euractiv.rs/srbija-i-eu/3433-pad-podrke-graana-ulasku-u-eu (last 
accessed 19.1.2012).
2 GfK Bosnia: B&H citizenry support to eventual EU membership 
http://www.gfk.ba/public_relations/press/press/003217/index.
en.html (last accessed 24.1.2012).
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provisions on a purely technical level, the results 
reflect absorption and the partial transformation of 
institutional structures. 
Contrary to the self-criticism of the EU 
regarding its lack of knowledge for the annual 
evaluation of the EU approximation process, 
actors in BiH and Serbia involved in the 
approximation largely support the opinion that 
the results of the annual reports are accurate and 
realistically reflect the situation in their respective 
countries. Last year’s progress reports have been 
precise in their identification of the failures of 
domestic policy. In both countries this mainly 
refers to deficits in approximating EU directives 
and regulations. In addition, these reports are 
understood as being based on precise, detailed 
and policy-focused technical information and are 
accepted as an effective instrument of evaluation. 
Many domestic actors even claimed that the EU 
should put more pressure on the governments of 
both countries by introducing stricter standards 
for the annual evaluation. In fact, one think 
tank representative on the domestic level has 
stated that the EU “hopefully won’t be as soft on 
corruption issues as it was the case with Bulgaria 
and Romania”. 
Despite tangible enlargement fatigue, the 
EU still profits from being viewed as an honest 
broker in the Western Balkans. However, several 
limitations are reducing the benefit of this image. 
When it comes to the demands placed on the 
potential candidates and the set of progression 
steps leading to EU accession, and when 
they compare these to their Western Balkan’s 
neighbours, the EU is no longer as trustworthy as 
it was at the beginning of the association process 
in 2003. While the main point of criticism in 
Serbia is the EU’s discordant position towards 
the Kosovo issue, actors in Bosnia- Herzegovina 
claim that only the “general” demands of the EU 
towards the country are congruent and traceable, 
while this is not the case when it comes to the 
evaluation of politically sensitive topics such 
as the visa liberalisation issue or the status of 
approximation granted to some neighbouring 
countries. Referring to the specific demands 
set out for Bosnia-Herzegovina, civil servants 
working for the entities claim that steps for further 
EU approximation remain “unclear” and are 
introducing “political conditionality as something 
technical”, one civil servant even accused the 
EU of regularly changing “requirements” and 
employing “double standards”. The demands 
of a new constitution and a re-settlement of 
competencies between entities and central level 
are especially viewed as an obstacle towards 
further EU integration. In Serbia, domestic actors 
argued for the opting out of the Kosovo issue 
based on the fact that the EU has not agreed on 
a common position on the issue thus far. While 
“most of the acquis related statements are clear all 
Kosovo related statements are blurry”.
This assessment shows that on a technical 
level of policy-making demands and the rules 
of the game are clear and traceable, which leads 
to the conclusion that acquis conditionality is 
functioning on a working level even when the 
results (of domestic policy efforts) are negative. 
This is particularly true for all acquis related 
policies dealing with single market issues. When it 
comes to the different demands of the EU towards 
the potential candidate countries, research shows 
that civil servants working in a line ministry with 
a clearly applicable acquis chapter (e.g. 1-4 on 
single market) are assessing these demands as 
reasonable and manageable. Overall, the demands 
of the European Commission are “technically 
okay” but where they touch upon politically 
controversial issues, broad support for the EU 
standards is lacking. 
Other recently introduced criteria for the 
opening of EU accession negotiations such as 
regional cooperation, the successful cooperation 
with the ICTY or Serbia’s cooperation in regard to 
North-Kosovo have been viewed critically by actors 
involved in the approximation process, as well as 
the general domestic public. In both countries, one 
is aware of the fact that new political criteria have 
been introduced in addition to the accession criteria 
that were employed in the CEE countries for the 
2004/07 EU enlargement. The question arises 
whether the EU is following its own hand-book 
of enlargement with clear rules for all involved 
players, or merely introduces new conditions once 
the previous demands have been fulfilled, without 
offering new and attractive incentives.
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Concerning the equal treatment of all 
potential candidate countries as demanded for 
an enlargement “by the book”, these countries 
constantly compare their own performance to 
that of their neighbours and in general strive 
to achieve better results. However, despite 
claims, this comparison is not always leading to 
constructive competition and progress in terms of 
EU approximation. 
Country specific reasons for lack of progress
What decisive reasons for non-compliance 
with EU conditionality can be found within the 
countries themselves? 
First of all, the legacies of war clearly have an 
impact on the EU approximation process in both 
countries. Political actors point out that society 
still needs to come to terms with the past; however 
the failures of the current political situation are 
not solely attributed to historical circumstances.
For Bosnia-Herzegovina, war legacies have 
particular implications. Further progress of the 
EU’s Europeanisation policy is closely connected 
to the success or failure of a thorough 
constitutional reform for the whole country, which 
would as a result, overcome the post-war Dayton 
regime. The vast majority of actors are convinced 
that such a reform needs to be implemented before 
the country can become a full-fledged member of 
the EU. Interestingly, political actors in Bosnia-
Herzegovina seem to ignore the fact that the EU 
does not prescribe a specific kind of constitutional 
reform but rather demands consistent positions; 
this includes a clear division of competences for 
each policy and a problem-solving mechanism for 
cases in which the decision-makers on different 
political levels disagree. However actors working 
on the entity level share a common position that 
points in the opposite direction. The EU’s push 
for institutional changes for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is seen as interference in domestic politics, and 
an attempt to push for a “transfer of authority 
[from entity] to the central level”. At the same 
time, doubts and concerns arise as to whether 
such substantial reform can be implemented only 
through internal, domestic efforts and without 
being bound to the tight structures of a wider 
institutional setting. 
In Serbia recent history is mainly concerned 
with the political status of Kosovo and its 
international recognition. The government is 
blaming the EU for not having a common and 
congruent position on the topic. This lack of 
unanimity diminishes the overall credibility 
of the EU within the approximation process 
and reduces the acceptance of democratic 
conditionality in the country. Meanwhile it seems 
to be a matter of common sense in Serbia that 
this controversial issue needs to be settled before 
final accession negotiations and a full-fledged EU-
membership. However, political actors want the 
EU to acknowledge the progress the country has 
achieved during the 12 years since the initiation of 
a democratic transition. 
Another factor often mentioned as a reason 
for slowing down the process of approximation 
is a lack of self-confidence exhibited by the 
government and the civil servants. According 
to our findings, this does not seem to have a 
significant impact in both countries. In Serbia, 
the argument is not supported at all, while in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, opinions on self-
confidence of the government are divided. While 
some domestic actors view the government as 
“more than self-confident”, others would like to 
see, in general, a more congruent approach with 
a state-wide perspective towards the EU and its 
member states. However, this is not perceived 
as one of the main reasons for a failure of EU 
conditionality. 
While in Serbia a national consensus for EU 
membership has been established under President 
Boris Tadić, who communicated his decisions to the 
entire public administration as well as to Serbian 
society, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is difficult to evaluate. On the entity level of 
Republika Srpska, civil servants confirm the 
existence of a national consensus on EU accession. 
Simultaneously, public servants working at the 
federal level or the entity level of the federation 
question the commitment of Republika Srpska, and 
deny that a national agreement has been supported 
by all actors involved. This dissent indicates at least 
an imagined lack of national consensus for EU 
membership, and could prove to be a considerable 
obstacle in the approximation process.
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A decisive reason for the fitfulness of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s EU approximation lies in the weak 
economic performance of the country. Economic 
decline, mainly caused by the international 
financial and economic crisis since 2008, as 
well as the weak micro-economic structures 
within the country itself, have been identified as 
responsible for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s inability 
to fully comply with the single market related 
EU acquis. This is further supported by national 
polls in which economic prosperity is named as 
one of the three main reasons for which Bosnia-
Herzegovina should join the EU, the other two 
factors being stability and individual freedom. In 
Serbia, the situation is perceived differently. The 
country has been severely hit by the international 
financial crisis as early as 2008, making it the first 
case in which the EU granted IPA funding for 
general budget aid in order to combat the budget 
deficit. Furthermore, the economic situation called 
for a 15% reduction of state employees in early 
2010. However, the domestic economy is not seen 
as the main driving (and thus breaking) force of 
the approximation process. According to actors 
involved, intrinsic structural problems of Serbian 
politics are causing these economic deficits and 
have to be made responsible for its slow progress. 
The country still needs to “overcome its 19th 
century national legacy”. The political culture 
which mainly focuses on preserving the status 
quo of political power needs to be changed by the 
country itself. This “switch of Serbia’s political 
culture” is essential for “bridging the time zone 
gap” between the EU and Serbia. 
Overall, economic reasons are given much 
more importance in Bosnia-Herzegovina than 
in Serbia although general macro-economic 
indicators show that Bosnia-Herzegovina has 
recently been better off than its neighbour. 
However, interviewees in Serbia put greater 
weight on structural political problems that owe 
to the country’s past such as connections between 
military structures and legislative forces and the 
open Kosovo issue. 
Recommendations
1. In general, in order to accelerate the accession 
process the EU should acknowledge 
the importance of their continuous 
approximation process for peace, security 
and stability in the whole of Europe, 
regardless if Western Balkan countries are 
small and economically less relevant for the 
EU. The actors aware of this fact should then 
form a more prominent and active coalition to 
advocate the need for enlargement towards the 
Western Balkans. 
2. Considering the acquis conditionality as 
main enlargement instrument, the EU should 
take into consideration the situation on the 
ground (political structure, national specifics) 
when adapting the instruments designed 
to bring these countries closer to the EU. 
Regarding the progress reports, the EU should 
not try to stress progress at all costs. Rather, 
it should clearly state the shortcomings of 
the individual country’s progress and sketch 
out reasons. However, it is important that the 
line of argumentation is clearly established 
and based on technical rather than political 
evaluation. This will give pro-integrationist 
actors a line of argumentation against a variety 
of veto players.
3. Beyond acquis conditionality, the EU should 
look for additional instruments. Since 
promises might not be upheld, and the basket 
of rewards or carrots could soon be empty, the 
EU should not neglect the political dialogue 
in favour of technical absorption. This also 
means that the EU should try to spend more 
effort and to be more proactive in achieving 
national, political compromises especially 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, the EU 
should work on its own credibility as the 
level of approval of the EU’s decisions has 
decreased significantly in both countries. 
Simultaneously, clear timeframes need to 
be established wherever possible. People as 
well as administrations tend to fail in their 
own efforts if there are no short- or medium-
term incentives in sight. Concrete examples 
for enhanced engagement from the EU’s side 
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could involve more frequent enlargement-
focused summits to offer more visibility and 
proof of the EU’s unwavering commitment 
for enlargement. In addition to the merely 
technical side of enlargement and this top-
down approach, the EU should not lose out 
of sight the citizens. In order to cater to their 
needs, a bottom up approach should be added. 
This could include informing citizens across 
the country about the relevance of accession 
for them individually and according to a 
variety of target groups (farmers, youth) to 
show them the hard and soft benefits of their 
countries’ EU membership.
